Project 05
Node.js HEAD (v28.0.0-pre)
Audit of the Node.js https Agent TLS-policy isolation machinery confirming a residual verification bypass.
Audit of the Node.js https Agent TLS-policy isolation machinery that
confirmed a residual verification bypass in a shipped security-fix
cluster.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Version audited | HEAD 67e45e4a (v28.0.0-pre), comparison on v24.19.0 |
| Confirmation runs | 2026-11-13 / 2026-11-14 |
| Status | Audit, mechanism reproduction on HEAD, severity assessment |
| Confirmed findings | 1 (High, proposed) + 1 refuted hypothesis |
| Vendor report | Draft prepared, not submitted |
Scope
lib/https.js Agent session keying and reuse conditions,
lib/internal/tls/wrap.js identity verification on resume, and the
documented behavior contract in doc/api/https.md.
Findings
| ID | Finding | Status | Proposed severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| FIND-001 | https Agent silently drops per-request checkServerIdentity overrides on session reuse when the agent itself carries a checker — strict requests run over sessions validated under the agent’s (possibly lenient) policy |
Confirmed (HEAD ASan build + control experiment) | High (8.1 proposed, triage pending) |
| FIND-002 | TLS-policy object key “recycling” hypothesis | False positive — refuted before reproduction (monotonic id counter cannot collide) | — |
Root cause (summary)
The fix cluster for the July 2026 advisories (CVE-2026-48934 /
CVE-2026-58040) keys sessions by object identity of the policy options —
but the per-request checker override uses a presence-only guard: when the
agent itself has a checkServerIdentity, the request-level checker never
becomes a key component nor the verifying callback, so a distinct identity
policy inherits sessions validated under the agent’s policy with no
re-validation.
Verification highlights
- Reproduced on a freshly built HEAD binary (ASan build), not just a released build — the residual is present in the current development line.
- Control experiment: without an agent-level checker, the same strict per-request overrides are correctly enforced — isolating the defect to the presence-only guard.
- Variant matrix: trust-policy keying (CA change) is correctly isolated; identity-policy keying is not.
- Honest dedup analysis: positioned as a residual of the public CVE chain, with an explicit scope-ruling request to triage.
Upstream status
Unpatched at the audited HEAD. Two remediation options recorded (equality-based eligibility; checker-on-resume). Draft report prepared for the Node.js security lane, held pending authorization and submission.